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HENRY WiNTHROP BALLAN=NE**T HE new 1933 Illinois Business Corporation Act springs from the
patient, unselfish labors of lawyers, legal scholars, accountants
and officials who have given freely of their time and thought for
several years toward its preparation and passage. No doubt the major
burden of drafting has fallen most heavily on one or two men. The new
act is part of a notable legislative movement, sponsored for the most part
by bar association committees, which has been carried on in the last few
years in Ohio, Indiana, California, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Washington, and Pennsylvania. This movement has been influenced to a
greater or less extent by the Uniform Business Corporation Act and also by
the Delaware General Corporation Law. The new Pennsylvania Business
Corporation Law of 1933 is largely founded upon the Illinois draft of 1931,
although also influenced by the California General Corporation Law of
1931.
As one who has devoted much time since 1928 as draftsman for the
State Bar Committee to doctoring up the superannuated corporation laws
of California, the writer has been invited to comment upon the new
Illinois act. It is not necessary here to praise the good points of the new
law or to point to the improvements made upon the Illinois General Cor-
poration Act of i9i9. Rather it seems advisable, with all deference to the
Committee, to attempt a critical testing of the leading provisions of the
new act in comparison with other modern acts, particularly the California
General Corporation Law, with a view to calling attention to certain
doubtful points that may possibly call for further study and revision. In
California the work of revision has required the continuing efforts of the
State Bar Committee and its draftsman prior to, and during, the last three
legislative sessions.
* Acknowledgment is made for cooperation to Fletcher Lewis, Esq., of the Chicago Bar,
Wilber G. Katz, Esq., of the University of Chicago Law School, and George S. Hills, Esq.,
of New York City.
** Professor of Law, School of Jurisprudence, University of California.
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The article will consider in the first place provisions dealing.with ques-
tions of corporation finance, such as stated capital; the issue of shares; the
purchase, redemption, and retirement of shares;.treasury shares; declara-
tion of dividends; reduction of stated capital, and the liability of directors
and shareholders. Then certain other important topics will be touched
upon, such as de facto corporations; ultra vires contracts; sale of entire
assets; inspection of records; reports and financial statements to share-
holders; voting rights; election of directors and, finally, winding up and
dissolution.
On many of these matters there is much room for difference of opinion
and discussion as to the policies, restrictions, and liabilities that should be
embodied in the law. A modern corporation act is an intricate mechanism
which must have many delicate adjustments in balancing the claims of
efficiency of management, the due limitations of official discretion, the
simplification of formalities as to voting and certificates to be filed, and the
protection of the rights of creditors and of share holders of different classes
and factions. There is danger of abuse of remedies given to the minority
as well as of the fraudulent abuse of power by the majority. The need of
brevity in such a survey will perhaps excuse some reference to the writer's
exposition of the provisions of the California General Corporation Law.2
STATED CAPITAL
The use of the term "capital stock" has wisely been avoided in the
Illinois Act, as in several of the recent corporation acts.3 It is important
to adopt some exact, clear-cut term for what may be called the "capital
liability" of a corporation, which operates as a brake upon declarations of
dividends and purchases of its own shares. 4 The legal surplus cannot be
ascertained without deducting the true amount of the stated capital from
the value of the net assets. The right to de6lare dividends and purchase
the corporation's own shares is in general made to depend upon the exist-
ence of an earned surplus. (§§ 6, 41.)
"Capital stock" is sometimes used to refer to shares of stock, sometimes
to the aggregate amount of the par value shares authorized in the articles,
sometimes to the assets received from the shareholders upon the issue of
2 Ballantine, California Corporation Laws (i932), Supplement (1933).
'Cal. Civ. Code (1931), Gen. Corp. Law, § 3oob; Ohio Page's Ann. Code (1932; supp.)
Gen. Corp. Act, § 8623-37; Minn. Laws of '933, c. 300, §§ 3-10; Pa. Bus. Corp. Act, §§ 2,
614.
4 Delaware uses the term "capital" for this purpose. Del. Gen. Corp. Law, §§ 14, 19, 26,
27, 28, 34.
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shares.5 The term "stated capital" came into use in connection with non-
par shares and the permission to credit part of the consideration received
to paid-in surplus and the balance to stated capital.
By the Illinois definition stated capital is measured by the amount of
capital contributions of the shares "then issued" whether par or non-par.
In two sections there is a reference to "any surplus arising from surrender
to the corporation of any of its shares." It may seem to be implied that if
shares are surrendered to the corporation they cease to be issued and that
there is an automatic reduction of stated capital and the creation of a
surplus without any other proceedings. (See §§ 6, 41.) But the Illinois
act is evidently drafted upon the assumption that shares once issued re-
main issued until they are permanently retired and stated capital is re-
duced pursuant to statutory authority. (§§ 58, 59.)
By Section i9 certain limitations are placed upon the amount of the
consideration for shares without par value which may be allocated to paid-
in surplus in case such shares have a preference in event of involuntary
liquidation. But if non-par shares have no liquidation preference the
total consideration paid in excess of a nominal part may be allocated to
paid-in surplus. Thus if $i,ooo,ooo is received as consideration for non-
par common shares, $999,ooo of this amount may be allocated to paid-in
surplus. The directors are given 6o days after issue to make the allocation
if the shares are issued for services or property other than cash, as under
Section 14 of the Delaware law. Perhaps the percentage of the considera-
tion which may be allocated to paid-in surplus should be limited to say
50 per cent, and the allocation should be made in all cases upon the issue
of the shares as a valuation of the consideration in monetary terms should
be made prior to issue.'
The dangerous laxity of the Delaware law as to the creation and use of
paid-in surplus is guarded against under the Illinois act by limitations
imposed upon the corporation as to the use of paid-in surplus for dividends
and for the purchase of shares. Under the Delaware law the net assets in
excess of capital may be freely used either for dividends or the purchase of
shares.7 Both in the Illinois and California corporation laws limitations
are placed on the use of paid-in surplus for such purposes which make it
truly a capital surplus.8
s Fletcher, Cyc. Corps. (i932 ed.) § 5o79; Ill. Gen. Corp. Act, igi, §§ 6 (4), 33, 34, 39;
Armstrong v. Emmerson, 300 Ill. 54, 132 N.E. 768, 18 A.L.R. 693 (1921).
6 See Cal. Civ. Code (93), § 3ooa; Ballantine, Questions of Policy, i9 Cal. L. Rev. 465,
471 (193r).
7 Del. Gen. Corp. Law, §§ 19, 34.
8 Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stats. (1933), Bus. Corp. Act, C. 32, §§ 6, 41; Cal. Civ. Code (93i), §§
342, 346.
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ISSUE OF SHARES: CONSIDERATION AND PAYMENT
The new act, Section 17, requires that par value shares shall be issued
for a consideration not less than the par value. There is no recognitionof
the common law exception established in most jurisdictions permitting
issue at less than par in the case of a going concern. 9 The basis of this
exception is that no wrong is done either to creditors or existing share-
holders by issuing shares for what they are actually worth. It seems im-
possible to set up in advance an arbitrary minimum for the issue price of
shares for all time to come. The doctrine that an embarrassed corporation,
or a corporation which has incurred losses, may issue its par shares at less
than par is founded on sound reasons of practical policy. What is the
sense of a hard and fast requirement that par value shares can never be
issued for less than par, which inevitably drives the management to the
good old plan of having the shares issued for property or services of
dubious value and then donated back to the corporation to be sold as
treasury shares at whatever discount may be desired?
Section 17 calls inflexibly for payment of the par value, but Section r8
provides a simple detour around the requirement by providing that while
shares issued for cash must be fully paid up to the par value, shares may be
issued for property tangible or intangible or for services, and the judg-
ment of the board of directors, in the absence of actual fraud in the
transaction, shall be conclusive as to the value of the consideration
received.
The California law9a provides that shares may be issued for less than
par if the board of directors determine that the shares cannot be sold at
par. Par value shares may thus be issued for a consideration less than par
as fully paid up under a resolution of the board of directors determining
that such shares cannot be sold at par and only the amount of the agreed
consideration is credited to stated capital. °
I It is a fiction to assert that creditors are in any way deceived by the
'issue of par value shares for less than their par value. Creditors do not
in fact rely upon the valuations arrived at by the directors, but on their
own estimates of the corporate assets and credit. Since the amount of the
9 Clark v. Bever, 139 U.S. 96, Ii Sup. Ct. 468, 35 L. Ed. 88 (i89i); Handley v. Stutz, 139
U.S. 417, ii Sup. Ct. 53 o , 35 L. Ed. 227 (i89i); Camden v. Stewart, i44 U.S. o4, ii6, 12
Sup. Ct. 585, 36 L. Ed. 363 (1892).
9a Cal. Civ. Code (i931), § 299.
10 A provision for issue at less than par is contained in the Indiana Act and also in the Mary-
land Act. Ind. Burn's Ann. Stats. (1929 supp.) § 4827 (c); Md. Bagby's Ann. Code (1929
supp.) Art. 23, §§ 41 (8), 43, 44. See also Ohio Page's Ann. Code (1932 supp.), § 8623-16; 19
and 2o Geo. 5, C. 23, § 47 (1929), power to issue shares at a discount.
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consideration can easily be varied by paying commissions or by issuing the
shares for property or services of uncertain values, there seems to be no
utility in forbidding the issue of par value shares at a discount, which is
merely accepting in terms what the law has already conceded in practice.
Such a provision as that contained in Section 299 of the California law
enables corporations to issue shares from time to time at varying prices
within a fair range of discretion according to market conditions without
danger of liability to creditors or technical objection by minority share-
holders, and eliminates the subterfuge of issuing shares on the basis of
fictitious valuations of patents, options, and good will, and the donation
of such shares to the corporation's treasury for purposes of sale at a dis-
count after the immunity bath. It gives par value shares much the same
flexibility as to issue price possessed by non-par shares, and obviates an
undue increase of the stated capital account by the process of stock water-
ing. There can be no actual fraud, either on creditors or upon share-
holders, committed in issuing shares for their true value though less than
par."
The situation may be illustrated as follows. The X corporation is au-
thorized to issue ioo,ooo shares of common stock at $5 par value. It
issues 5o,ooo shares at $5 par value, giving it a stated capital of $250,000.
The first year's operations result in a loss of $50,000. Additional capital is
needed and there are buyers for the unissued shares willing to pay $4 per
share. Under the Illinois requirement the corporation must reduce the par
value of its shares and its stated capital in order to be able to issue these
shares for cash without subterfuge and circumvention. Reduction pro-
ceedings may mean delay, loss of market, and perhaps may frighten away
the investors. The issue of the new shares at the current market price,
though below par, would seem to be the obvious procedure for the benefit
of the creditors and the existing shareholders.
Under Section i8 while neither promissory notes nor future services
may constitute payment or part payment for shares of a corporation,
there is nothing either in this section or Section 17 which would forbid the
issue or creation of shares as partly paid shares for a small amount of
executed consideration with the balance of the consideration evidenced
by notes or contracts to give future services. A person may become an
owner of shares and a shareholder of record with all the rights incident
thereto except a certificate, although he has paid only a nominal executed
consideration. (§§ 16, 23.) Under Section 21, however, no certificate for
shares may be issued for any share until the balance of the consideration
1 See Dodd, Stock Watering (1930), 235-241.
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for the share is fully paid up or executed. It is not clear whether it is
intended to forbid the acceptance of promissory notes of third parties or
of the corporation or corporate debentures in payment for its shares.
PREINCORPORATION SUBSCRIPTIONS
In order to meet the constitutional requirement of election of directors
by the shareholders, Section 16 of the Illinois act provides that the filing
of articles of incorporation by the secretary of state shall ipso facto make
subscribers for shares into shareholders of record, apparently without
reference to payment or the conditions of the subscription contract. This
is necessary to provide voting shareholders, for unless the subscribers
become shareholders automatically there is no one with authority to ac-
cept subscriptions or issue shares for the corporation. The authority to
obtain the necessary subscriptions to shares and to manage the corporate
affairs prior to the election of directors is sometimes conferred on the in-
corporators.Y Under the general law incorporation makes preincorpora-
tion subscriptions irrevocable contracts, but does not have the effect of
making the subscribers shareholders without some act of acceptance on
behalf of the corporation.3 Under Sections 17 and x8 some payment of
executed consideration is required for the issue of shares, but it appears
that under Section 16 shares may be issued for a wholly executory con-
sideration although such shareholders would not be entitled to any
certificate. (§ 21.) It would seem that any conditions precedent in pre-
incorporation subscriptions are rendered inoperative and it is impliedly
required that such subscriptions be absolute and unconditional.14
PREEMPTIVE RIGHTS
Section 24 of the act permits the preemptive right of a shareholder to
acquire "additional shares of a corporation" to be limited or denied in the
articles of incorporation. This section is a recognition that shareholders
have certain "preemptive rights" but it does not attempt to 'define the
extent of the right which may be so limited or denied or what is meant by
"additional shares."' 5 Does it extend to shares originally authorized but!A
unissued, or only to shares authorized by an amendment of the articles?
Does it extend to preferred shares and preferred shareholders? To treas-
ury shares? To non-voting shares? To the issue of shares for property?
To convertible bonds? All of these questions are in a state of more or less
uncertainty under the common law.
12 Del. Gen. Corp. Law, § 8. ' 3 61 A.L.R. 1463, 1522 note.
'4 See Pittsburgh & S. R. Co. v. Biggar, 34 Pa. 455 (1859).
is § 52 (o) as to amendments, refers to "additional shares .... whether then or thereafter
authorized."
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It seemed best to the California Committee to abrogate the common
law doctrine of preemptive rights for the reason that in a complex corpo-
rate structure the proper assignment of preemptive rights gives rise to
insoluble difficulties. What we really have is an obligation on the part of
the management to exercise the power of issuing shares in good faith in
such a way as to protect the interests of the existing shareholders.
As has been pointed out, 6 the doctrine of preemptive rights should
never have hardened into a rigid rule of law, and it should revert to its
original status as a remedy in equity against abuse of power. The trend
is to eliminate this right altogether.17
The Illinois act contains no provision such as is found in the Delaware,
California and Ohio acts as to the grant of options to purchase or sub-
scribe for shares evidenced by stock purchase warrants in connection with
the issue of shares and other securities.,8 The new Minnesota Business
Corporation Act' 9 has an interesting provision forbidding the granting of
options to subscribe or purchase shares independently of the issue of
shares or other securities except in case of options to shareholders to sub-
scribe rateably in proportion to the number of shares held. This limitation
might prevent certain abuses.2°
Employee stock purchase plans may be adopted under Section 24 by
vote of the holders of two-thirds of the shares or by the board of directors
pursuant to like approval of the shareholders. Such issue may be made
to any, employees of the corporation or of any "subsidiary corporation"
for such consideration and upon such terms and conditions as may be
so authorized without prior offer to the shareholders. The two-thirds vote
of the shareholders does not seem an adequate protection against such
abuses as were revealed in connection with the American Tobacco Com-
pany case where managerial officers obtained large blocks of cheap stock
to the detriment of the shareholdersY.2
,6 Berle & Means, Modem Corporation and Private Property (1932), 146, 176-179, 258,
259.
17 Cal. Civ. Code (r93i), § 297; Ind. Bum's Ann. Stats. (1929 supp.) § 4827 (i); Yoakum v.
Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533, 539 (i929); Ballantine, California Corporation
Laws (1932), 98-ioi; Drinker, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe New
Shares, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 586, 616 (193o); Ballantine, Questions of Policy, 19 Cal. L. Rev.
465, 469 (1931).
is Del. Gen. Corp. Law, § 14; Cal. Civ. Code (1931), § 296; Ohio Page's Ann. Code, (r932
supp.), Gen. Corp. Act, § 8623-20.
19 Minn. Laws of 1933, C. 300, § r3 (VI).
"9 See Berle & Means, Modem Corporation and Private Property (1932), i8o-84; Ballan-
tine, Questions of Policy, ig Cal. L. Rev. 465, 468 (1931).
" Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. r23, 53 Sup. Ct. 295, 77 L. Ed. 382 (i933); 2r
Cal. L. Rev. 358 (933); 46 Harv. L. Rev. 828 (1933).
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SHAREHOLDERS' LIABILITY FOR ISSUE PRICE
The liability of subscribers and shareholders to the corporation or its
creditors is limited to "an obligation to pay to the corporation the full
consideration for which said shares were issued or to be issued" (§ 23).
This is somewhat ambiguous as to whether it limits the liability of the
shareholder as under the New York law to the agreed issue price or
whether it imposes liability for such amount as would make the shares
fully paid under the statutory requirements. It would seem that if the
subscriber or shareholder has fully complied with his contractual obligation
to the corporation he is under no further liability. The "issue" of the
shares is the agreement of the corporation and the subscriber to create a
share. If shares are issued for less than par or as a bonus without con-
sideration it is difficult to find superadded by this section any liability
either to the corporation or to its creditors. If the directors have violated
Section 17 the securities may be invalid, but the subscriber does not com-
mit any wrong against the corporation or its creditors or make himself
liable as upon a contract. His liability depends upon his contractual
agreement.2
Under the Delaware law, Section 20, the holder of par value shares is
made liable for the benefit of creditors up to the par value and it is only
in the case of shares without par value that his liability is limited to the
unpaid balance of the consideration for which the shares were issued by
the corporation. The Illinois provision would seem to do away with any
question of liability of the shareholder upon watered stock, that is where
shares are issued as full paid for less than par or for overvalued property,
and the only liability would be that of the directors if any.
2 3
LIMITATIONS ON THE PURCHASE BY A CORPORATION
OF ITS OWN SHARES
One of the most stubbornly fought conflicts in corporation law is over
the proper limitations to be placed upon the power of a corporation to
purchase its own shares.24 Some of the most flagrant abuses and frauds
perpetrated by banks, public utility holding companies, investment trusts
= Christensen v. Eno, io6 N.Y. 97, 12 N.E. 618 (1887); Southworth v. Morgan, 205 N.Y.
293, 98 N.E. 490 (1912).
23 Compare the careful provisions as to liability of shareholders and directors for improper
issues of shares in the Minn. Act, Minn. Laws of 1933, c. 300, §§ 24 (IV), 15 (II), i8.
24 Consolidated 'Music Co. v. Brinkerhoff Piano Co., 64 F. (2d) 884 (i933); Levy, Purchase
by a Corporation of'its Own Stock, 15 Minn. L. Rev. i (193o); Berle & Means, Modem Cor-
poration and Private Property (1932), 174, 175; Ballantine, Questions of Policy, i9 Cal. L.
Rev. 465, 479 (1931).
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and corporations generally in recent years have been by market operations
by the corporate management in shares issued by the corporation and by
its affiliated corporations and by carrying their own shares as part of their
assets.
The Illinois Act, like the California law, seeks to discourage speculation
by a corporation in its own shares by restricting purchases in general to
earned surplus. The Illinois draftsmen, however, have avoided the use of
the term "earned surplus" on account of the difficulty of framing any
statutory definition of this accounting term, and have deemed it best to
back into the concept by a process of elimination. The Illinois Act limits
as a general rule the purchase by a corporation of its own shares by pro-
hibiting such purchase directly or indirectly unless it has assets over debts
and liabilities of not only the amount of its stated capital but also the
amount of its paid-in surplus, any surplus arising from unrealized ap-
preciation in value or revaluation of its assets and "any surplus arising
from surrender to the corporation of its own shares. ' '2s Under the Dela-
ware General Corporation Law purchases of its shares may be made by
a corporation from any surplus, that is, as long as no impairment of
capital is caused.2Sa
An Illinois corporation is not expressly limited in any way, even by
solvency, in the purchase of its own shares for certain special purposes,
namely (a) eliminating fractional shares; (b) settling or compromising or
securing debts due the corporation previously incurred; (c) paying dissent-
ing shareholders in case of merger, consolidation or sale of assets. In
effecting the redemption of its preferred shares certain limitations are im-
posed under Section 58. While an Illinois corporation is legally limited in
using its funds to buy and sell its own shares for any other purpose, except
to the extent to which it may have an earned surplus, strangely enough no
statutory liability is imposed either upon directors or shareholders for the
violation of this limitation as there is under the California law.'
Under Section 6 a corporation is forbidden to purchase its own shares
in general either "directly or indirectly" except when it has an earned sur-
plus. The word "indirectly" may be construed as intended to prohibit the
common device of purchasing shares through a subsidiary or affiliated
company as a method of evasion of the limitation of purchases from earned
25 § 6. A surplus could arise from the surrender to the corporation of its own shares only if
the stated capital could be reduced upon such surrender, as treasury shares may not be in-
cluded in "net assets" for the purpose of determining the right of a corporation to declare divi-
dends or to purchase its own shares. § 2 (m).
2S, Del. Gen. Corp. Law, § r9.
6 See Cal. Civ. Code (1931), §§ 363, 365.
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surplus. This prohibition however might well be made more explicit as
to whether the earned surplus of the holding corporation or of the sub-
sidiary is to be affected.2 7
TREASURY SHARES
Under the Illinois act, if any of its shares are acquired by a corporation
(except for redemption and cancellation under Section 58) they are treas-
ury shares, that is, they continue to be regarded for some purposes as issued
shares. Such acquisition does not reduce the legal stated capital. In case
of purchase the effect is in general to reduce the earned surplus, since
(except for special purposes under Section 6 (a), (b), (c) and (d)) shares
may be purchased only by the use of what is equivalent to earned surplus
and no asset is received to take the place of what is paid out, any more
than in the case of a dividend. Earned surplus may not be reimbursed by
carrying treasury shares as an asset.28
The phrase "net assets" as relating to the determination of the right of a
corporation to purchase its own shares or to declare and pay dividends,
is defined by the Illinois act to exclude shares of its own stock "belonging
to the corporation.1 2
9
The definition of treasury shares in Section 2 (j) as shares of its own
stock "belonging to a corporation," which are to be deemed issued shares
but not outstanding shares, seems to be inaccurate and misleading. A
corporation can never in any true sense be the owner of its own shares any
more than the same individual can be both debtor and creditor. Treasury
shares, if an asset for any purpose, are of a kind which will be found with-
out value when it becomes important for creditors to realize upon them. 30
The Illinois act (§ 2 (f)) defines "shares" as units of interest "into which
the shareholders' rights to participate in the control of the corporation,
in its surplus or profits, or in the distribution of its assets, are divided."
A corporation can of course have none of these rights against itself. When
such a unit is once created in favor of a third party and is then surrendered
to the corporation, it is only by a fiction of law that it can be regarded as
still "issued" or "belonging to the corporation," and its reissue is in real-
ity the creation of a new unit of interest, although made subject to certain
exceptions as to the usual requirements with reference to original issue.
27 See Cal. Civ. Code (193), § 342; Ohio Page's Ann. Code (1932 supp.), Gen. Corp. Act,
§ 8623-41.
28 See as to unfortunate practice sanctioned under Colorado law, Colorado Loan, etc. Co. v.
Clem, 82 Colo. 399, 260 Pac. 1o 9 (1927).
29 § 2 (m). See also Cal. Civ. Code (i93x), § 342b.
30 Graham & Katz, Accounting in Law Practice (1932), i54-156; Borg v. International
Silver Co., ii F. (2d) 147, 250 (1925).
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The normal rule would be that shares of stock automatically cease to be
issued when they are acquired by the corporation, but here a difficulty
arises. When a corporation has acquired its shares which it formerly
issued, and which have made their contribution to stated capital, it
should not be required upon reissue or sale to allocate to stated capital all
or any part of the consideration received upon such reissue, except in
cases where the stated capital has been reduced upon acquisition. The
legal way of describing this situation is to say that the corporation has a
right to hold the shares as "issued" and unextinguished, so that it may
dispose of them without increasing the stated capital. Their subsequent
reissue is treated by fiction as if it were a transfer of shares from the
original holder to the new purchaser through the medium of the corpora-
tion.
The fiction of treasury shares is also used to facilitate the sale of par
value shares at a discount and by an unfortunate accounting practice to
enter treasury shares as an asset, create a fictitious surplus and facilitate
the speculation by a corporation in its own shares.
If a corporation is permitted to reduce its stated capital in connection
with the purchase or redemption of its shares, then such shares acquired
"out of stated capital" may well be treated as restored to the status of
authorized but unissued shares. Upon reissue they will make a contribu-
tion to stated capital to take the place of reduction upon their retire-
ment.311
It is important that accountants and others should understand that
in truth and reality treasury shares are not issued shares at all. They have
no real existence, cannot be voted and are not counted for voting purposes,
cannot receive dividends or distributions of assets and are not an asset of
the corporation. They bring nothing to the corporation on liquidation.
The effect of the purchase or acquisition of shares by the corporation is
simply to increase the proportional right of participation of the remaining
shareholders in the remaining assets. They represent merely a power to
create or issue new shares if anyone wants them, which power is for cer-
tain technical reasons distinguished from the power to create shares upon
original issue. The only reason for this distinction is that the corporation
has already received a capital contribution creating a capital liability in
respect of the shares so issued and acquired which was not removed upon
acquisition of the shares.
There is no limitation in the Illinois act (see § i7) with reference to the
sale of treasury shares, that when such shares are disposed of by the cor-
31 Ballantine, Cal. Corp. Laws (1932), 310-32r; 1933 Supp., 127-r33.
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poration the consideration received shall not reimburse the earned sur-
plus. Earned surplus thus may become a revolving fund which may be
used over and over again for the purchase of shares. Provision is made,
however, in the California law that the entire consideration received upon
the sale of treasury shares shall be attributed to paid-in surplus except as
needed to write off a deficit of net assets below stated capital.32 Such sale
does not reimburse earned surplus. Any tendency of a corporation to
speculate in its own shares will be discouraged by the requirement of at-
tributing the proceeds to paid-in surplus which is not generally available
for the further purchase of shares. The speculation by a corporation in its
own shares is thus not so much restricted under the Illinois law as it is
under the California law.
There is no provision of the Illinois act that when preferred par value
shares are converted into common shares the stated capital shall not be
increased. The surrender of the preferred shares to the corporation will
leave such shares in the status of treasury shares and the par value of the
common shares issued must be added to the stated capital. An amend-
ment of the articles under Section 52 would be necessary to prevent an
increase of stated capital upon such conversion. Under the California and
Delaware law, however, no change in stated capital is made by the con-
version of one class of shares into other shares, s3 and the shares sur-
rendered have the status of authorized but unissued shares. Under the
Illinois act there is no increase of stated capital upon the conversion of
non-par preferred shares into other shares. (§§ 2 (k), 17.)
DECLARATION AND PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS
Section 41 of the act imposes its limitations both upon the declaration
and also upon the payment of dividends. Most corporation laws impose
their limitations only upon the declaration of dividends and the debt
which arises upon such declaration ranks with other debts so that the
shareholder may compete with other creditors in case of supervening in-
solvency. 34 In the case of contracts for the purchase of shares, on the
other hand, such contracts although valid when made, are generally held
unenforceable unless the corporation has the requisite surplus at the time
of performance. The seller of shares cannot compete with other credi-
tors.35
In general, cash or property dividends may be paid only out of earned
3 Cal. Civ. Code (1931), § 342b. 33 Cal. Civ. Code (i93i), § 342a.
34 See Ford v. Easthampton Rubber etc. Co., i58 Mass. 84, 32 N.E. 1036 (1893).
3' Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N.Y. 262, x69 N.E. 378 (1929); 29 Col. L. Rev. 356 (1929); 18
Corn. L. Quar. 589 (1933).
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surplus. Deduction must be made from net assets of the amount of the
stated capital. Deductions must also be made of the amount of any paid-
in surplus, "any surplus arising from the surrender to the corporation of
any of its shares," and any surplus arising from unrealized appreciation
in value, or revaluation, of assets, which also act as reserves or margins.
The remainder after making these deductions would seem to be "earned
surplus." Dividends may however be paid out of paid-in surplus or sur-
plus arising from the surrender of shares upon shares having a preferential
right to receive dividends.
The Illinois act does not permit the alternative which is allowed under
the English law, the Delaware law, the California law and the laws of a
number of states, of paying dividends out of net profits during a certain
accounting period, such as the current or preceding fiscal year whether or
not there is a surplus and in spite of impairment of stated capital, 6 if
preferred shares are protected by net assets equal to the stated capital
represented by them. It is said in the committee comments upon the 1931
draft of the fllinois Corporation Act, "Obviously no dividend should be
declared at a time when the net assets of the corporation are less than the
stated capital, or which will reduce the net assets below the stated capi-
tal." It has evidently been deemed a wise policy in a number of other
states, however, that investors should not necessarily be required by law
to forego dividends or income from their investment by reason of im-
pairment of the value of net assets below the stated capital, if the corpora-
tion is solvent, on the up grade, and has made profits from operations dur-
ing the current or the preceding year. Reasonable latitude is thus given
the directors for the exercise of discretion as to how best to write off past
losses without the formality of reducing the stated capital in cases where
the corporation has a deficit or its assets have diminished in value. There
is room for much difference of opinion on the subject of dividend limita-
tions, which at the present time are of very dubious value.
The Illinois law is more strict than the Delaware and California law in
not expressly excusing deduction for the depletion of wasting assets in
the case of wasting asset corporations, even in the case where there is only
one class of shares. Perhaps the courts might imply such an exception as
they have done elsewhere.37
36 Weiner, Anglo-Am. Dividend Law, 29 Col. L. Rev. 461, 473, 477 (1929); Berle, Revised
Del. Corp. Act, 29 Col. Rev. 563, 575 (1929); Weiner, Amount Available for Dividends, 29
Col. L. Rev. 9o6, 909 (r929); Ballantine, Questions of Policy, rg Cal. L. Rev. 465, 478 (1931);
Minn. Laws of 1933, § 21 (IIc).
37 See Del. Gen. Corp. Law, § 34; Cal. Civ. Code (931), § 346; 5s A.L.R. 8, 4r, note;
Weiner, Anglo-Am. Dividend Law, 29 Col. L. Rev. 46r, 477, 482 (1929), 3o Col. L. Rev. 330,
355 (1930)-
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Strange to say share dividends are not allowed out of paid-in surplus
except on preferred shares, but they are allowed under Section 41 (c) out
of surplus arising from unrealized appreciation in value, or revaluation of
assets. The California committee included a provision prohibiting share
dividends on such a basis although permitting them out of paid-in sur-
plus.35 Share dividends are declared as a rule for stock market purposes
and "cutting the melon" has contributed to the profits of many a pool.
Stock dividends are frequently a method of deceiving the public and the
statutes should not encourage the declaration of such dividends, especially
out of unrealized earnings and revaluation of assets. 39
There is no provision in connection with the use of paid-in surplus per-
mitting a corporation to declare share dividends against such surplus or to
write off losses or a deficit in earned surplus by the application of paid-in
surplus. Some accountants argue that a deficit in the account of earned
surplus may not be written off by the application of capital surplus, and
this point may well be settled by statute.40
In connection with the declaration of a dividend payable in shares with-
out par value, such shares may be issued at such value as shall be fixed
by the board of directors. It might be deemed a wise policy to make some
more strict requirement as to the amount of surplus which should be
transferred to stated capital such as the liquidation price in case of pre-
ferred shares and the estimated fair value upon issue of common shares
or an amount arrived at by multiplying the average stated capital repre-
sented by all shares of that class then issued by the number of shares issued
as a dividend. 41
Section 41 (a) prohibits payment of a dividend on shares having a
preference as to dividends over the shares upon which the dividend is paid,
unless expressly authorized in the articles. This is one restriction in the
Illinois act which is not found in other corporation acts, although the
danger of abuse has been pointed out in Berle & Means, Modern Corpora-
tion and Private Property (p. 197). Such dividends on preferred shares
might be used as a device to give common shareholders a preferred claim
on future earnings or distribute paid-in surplus to common shareholders. 42
38 Cal. Civ. Code (1931): § 346a.
39 See Berle & Means, Modem Corporation and Private Property (932), 167; Weiner,
Anglo-Am. Dividend Law, 29 Col. L. Rev. 981-983 (1929).
40 Cal. Civ. Code (i931), § 346c. 41 Cal. Civ. Code (931), § 346a.
42 Under the Minn. Act, Minn. Laws of 1933, § 21 (III d), no dividend payable in shares of
any class shall be paid to shareholders of any other class unless the articles so provide or such
payment is authorized by the vote or written consent of the holders of I of the shares of the
class in which payment is to be made. See 28 Ill. L. Rev. 566 (1933).
THE ILLINOIS BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
A fairly easy method of evasion of the restriction of Section 41 (c) for-
bidding cash dividends out of surplus from unrealized appreciation may
be found under Section ig which permits the directors by resolution to
order "that all or part of the surplus of the corporation be transferred to
stated capital." The stated capital may then be reduced and the paid-in
surplus thereby credited may be distributed in cash or in kind to the
shareholders under Section 6o. A similar method of evasion would seem
to be open under the California law,43 except that distribution of the "re-
duction surplus" is more strictly limited.
The general limitations upon dividends as upon purchases by the cor-
poration of its shares are (i) earned surplus of net assets in excess of stated
capital, and (2) solvency or an equivalence between the amount of its
assets and liabilities. Earned surplus is a far better limitation than surplus
generally, including all excess of net worth over stated capital; but even
earned surplus of net assets may be based largely upon fixed, unmarket-
able and frozen assets, such as investment in plant and permanent im-
provements. Surplus has no relation to "current ratio" of liquid assets to
current liabilities and so to the ability of the corporation to meet its debts
and liabilities as they fall due and to keep sufficient "working capital" to
continue the business. Great abuses are possible within the statutory
limits as to surplus. The directors might well be made expressly re-
sponsible for the exercise of reasonable care in declaring dividends and
making share purchases, with a view to maintaining a prudent margin to
meet debts and liabilities as they mature and to continue the operation of
the business for the benefit of creditors and shareholders. Such a general
limitation, putting the responsibility upon directors, might be more
practical than the complicated system of stated capital and surplus or the
net profits limitation, all of which involve valuation and estimates of
assets and liabilities, which are subject to accounting manipulation and
which determine little as to the propriety or safety of dividends or share
purchases.
LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS FOR IMPROPER DIVIDENDS, DISTRIBUTIONS
OF ASSETS AND LOANS TO OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
Liability to reimburse the corporation is imposed upon the directors
who vote for or assent to the declaration of certain improper dividends or
other distributions of assets to the shareholders, but only if the corpora-
tion is insolvent or its stated capital is impaired or if the declaration of the
dividend or other distribution will render the corporation insolvent or
reduce its net assets below its stated capital. No civil liability seems to be
43 CaL Civ. Code (193), §§ 348c, 3 48b.
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imposed upon the directors for violations of the dividend limitations of
Section 41 as to paragraphs (b) to (h) inclusive, for example declaration or
payment of dividends out of paid-in surplus or from unrealized apprecia-
tion in value or revaluation of assets, nor for declaration or payment of
dividends contrary to restrictions in the articles, nor for improper share
dividends. No liability is imposed upon the directors for authorizing the
wrongful payment of a dividend as authorized by a valid declaration
thereof if the corporation later incurs a deficit or becomes insolvent, un-
less this is included in the term "other distribution of the assets. '44
The measure of liability imposed by Section 42 (a) and (b) is the
amount of dividends paid or the value of the assets distributed if the cor-
poration be insolvent or its stated capital be impaired, or the extent to
which it is rendered insolvent or its net assets are reduced below the
amount of its stated capital. The civil liability to the corporation is no
doubt for the benefit of the creditors and the shareholders.prejudiced, but
is not limited to the amount of existing debts nor to the amount of loss
to the shareholders, so the directors may be held liable although the cor-
poration has no debts and the shareholders have suffered no loss, as may
well be the case if the capital is merely impaired. It seems a harsh and
penal liability to impose on the directors the entire amount of the pay-
ment without reference to the question of wilfulness or negligence or the
extent to which the debts and liabilities of the corporation are not paid or
whether anyone has been injured by the unauthorized dividend or distri-
bution. (Cf. § 42 (c).) Such an arbitrary, penal measure of damages is no
longer imposed by the California law. 45
The liability of the directors is apparently made absolute except in so
far as the declaration or distribution has been made in good faith in re-
liance upon a balance sheet and profit and loss statement duly represented
to be correct or certified by a public accountant, or if in good faith direc-
tors take the assets at their book value. Nothing is stated as to how the
amount of the liabilities, losses and other deductions shall be ascertained
in the absence of a financial statement.
No express provision is made as to the liability of shareholders for im-
proper dividends or other distribution of assets except to make propor-
tional "contribution" (i.e., reimbursement) to directors when the share-
holder knowingly has accepted or received any such dividend or assets.
"Knowingly" probably means with knowledge of facts indicating that it
was improper, as under the California law.4 6
4 As to remedies in event of a fraudulent share dividend, see Pontiac Packing Co. v. Han-
cock, 257 Mich. 45, 241 N.W. 268 (1931).
45 Cal. Civ. Code (1931), § 363; Ballantine, Cal. Corp. Laws, 1933 Supp., 2o-205.
4" Cal. Civ. Code (1931), §§ 363, 364, 365.
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The liability of the shareholder at the suit of the corporation, its
trustee in bankruptcy, receiver or creditors to respond for illegal dividends
and distributions innocently received is left in doubt and uncertainty. 47
The draftsmen may have intended that the primary liability should be
placed squarely on the directors for illegal dividends and distributions,
and that a shareholder should only be liable to return the amount re-
ceived to any director who might be held liable, if the shareholder ac-
cepted the dividend with knowledge of the fact that it was improperly
declared or paid. But the statutory liability of the directors does not
exonerate the shareholders and both directors and shareholders may be
sued concurrently.4 Moreover the instances in which the directors are
made liable do not cover all the situations where distributions may be
made contrary to the restrictions of the act.
There is no provision as to the liability of the directors or shareholders
in the event of improper purchase of shares by a corporation (§§ 6, 42)
nor for improper redemption of shares contrary to Section 58 nor for
violations of Section 6o (a) and (b) as to liquidating dividends. Perhaps
the phrase "other distribution of assets" in Section 42 (a) and (b) is in-
tended to cover purchases and redemption of shares as well as rateable
distribution. If a statute prohibits a particular act but fails to make pro-
vision for either criminal punishment or civil liability for its violation, the
transaction prohibited is presumably voidable and subject to rescission.
There may also be civil liability on the part of the violators depending
upon questions as to what are the classes of persons and what are the
interests which are intended to be protected and whether violation of the
act is negligence per se or mere evidence of negligence. (See § 8 (b).) An
innocent shareholder might very possibly be held liable to return the pur-
chase price received for his shares from the corporation contrary to
Section 6 of the act.
The criminal liability imposed on directors under Section 42 (h) for im-
proper declaration of dividends, other distributions of assets and loans to
officers and directors is absolute, irrespective of good faith or reasonable
care, and is not confined to wilful or negligent violations of the statute.
Reliance upon a balance sheet or profit and loss statement or upon the
book value of the assets is apparently no defense as to improper dividends
or distributions. This penal liability did not have the approval of the
committee which drafted the act.
The provision of Section 42 (c) making directors and officers personally
liable for "loans" to an officer or director of the corporation might well be
47 See note, 33 Col. L. Rev. 481 (1933); Minn. Laws of 1933, C. 300, §§ 22, 38.
48 Ulness v. Dunnell, 6z N.D. 95, 237 N.W. 208 (i93z).
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extended to cover indorsements or guarantees of the obligations of such
persons and also to the directors or officers of subsidiary corporations
lending its funds to directors or officers of its holding corporation. Cor-
poration statutes must take more express notice of the use of subsidiary
corporations in such matters as loans, purchases of shares, inspection and
financial statements. 49
REDEMPTION AND CANCELLATION OF SHARES
The Illinois Act is peculiar in failing to take cognizance of the possibility
of retiring shares to the status of authorized, but unissued shares, particu-
larly in connection with redemption and reduction of stated capital. This
results in arbitrary limitations. Provision for the reduction of stated
capital upon redemption of shares is made only in event that the'article
provide that the shares redeemed "shall be cancelled and shall not be
reissued." No provision is apparently made for the purchase or redemp-
tion of redeemable shares out of stated capital, or even from paid-in
surplus, unlcss the shares redeemed are required to be "cancelled" and
the authorized number of shares is to be reduced by what amounts to an
amendment to the articles of incorporation. Why does this section at-
tribute so much importance to "cancellation" and a provision that the
shares shall not be reissued in connection with redemption and reduction
of stated capital, when the authorized number of unissued shares has no
relation to the amount of stated capital?
The Delaware act49a and the California law49b permit the stated capital.
to be reduced either upon purchase or redemption of redeemable shares,
and such shares become unissued shares in the absence of provision that
they shall not be reissued. Under the California law if redeemable shares
are purchased from earned or paid-in surplus they may be carried as
treasury shares. If acquired out of stated capital, the shares are restored
to the status of authorized, but unissued shares and the stated capital
should be reduced. 5°
If stated capital may be reduced upon the redemption of redeemable
shares under the option reserved in the articles, why may it not also be
reduced upon the purchase of such shares for retirement in the open
market at a lower price? Provision is authorized for the creation of a
sinking fund for the redemption or purchase of shares. (§ 15 (e).)
The power to exercise the option of redemption of shares is subject to a
49 See Cal. Civ. Code (1931), §§ 278, 344, 366, 356, 357, 358.
49, Del. Gen. Corp. Law, § 27. 49b Cal. Civ. Code (193), §§ 342, 342a.
so See Ohio Page's Ann. Code (1932 supp.), § 8623-39 (2), (7).
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limitation similar to that in the California laws! that the remaining assets
of the corporation shall not be reduced below an amount sufficient to pay
all debts and known liabilities of the corporation as they mature, except
such debts and liabilities as have been adequately provided for. It is
difficult to see why similar limitations on the purchase of shares generally
should not have been included in Section 6, as they are in the California
law. s2 Even if a corporation has an earned surplus this surplus may be
represented by fixed assets and the use of funds to purchase shares might
threaten the ability of the corporation to meet its debts and liabilities as
they mature. A similar limitation also might well be included in Section
41 as to dividends as well as the general limitation of solvency and the
existence of an earned surplus.
There are serious objections to compulsory redemption provisions, but
there seems to be no restriction express or implied in the Illinois act
against including a provision in the articles of incorporation for the com-
pulsory redemption of preferred shares, that is for the purchase by a cor-
poration of its own shares at a fixed price at a future date or at the option
of the holder of the shares, subject to the restrictions of Section 58.53 Such
purchase may operate to cause an impairment of the net assets below the
amount of the stated capital and exhaust the funds which are needed in
the business at the time. The only limitation is the reservation of an
amount sufficient to pay all debts and known liabilities of the corporation
as they mature, except such as have been adequately provided for, and to
cover the aggregate amount of liquidation preferences of shares with
equal or prior rights. Such provisions for compulsory redemption have
been severely criticized as tending to fraud both on shareholders and on
creditors, and are expressly forbidden under the California law.S4 The
right of redemption should be an option to be exercised only by the cor-
poration in the discretion of the directors when it is deemed to be for the
benefit of the corporation to retire the preferred shares. Provision may,
however, be made for the accumulation of a sinking fund from net earn-
ings which may be required to be applied to the purchase or redemption of
redeemable shares.55
The second paragraph of Section 58 speaks of "debts and liabilities
adequately provided for." It might be well to define or explain this phrase
as meaning that the assumption or guarantee in good faith by one or more
5' Cal. Civ. Code (r931), § 342. s Ibid.
n §§ 6 (d), 14 (a), 15 (e), 47 (g), (h), 58-
54 Cal. Civ. Code (1930, § 294; Koeppler v. Crocker Chair Co., 200 Wis. 476, 228 N.W.
130 (1930); Ballantine, Cal. Corp. Laws (1932), 357, 1933 Supp., 47.
ss See Cal. Civ. Code (193r), § 294; Illinois Act, § i5 (c).
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solvent individuals or corporations of such debts and liabilities would be
deemed an adequate provision, if so determined in good faith and with
reasonable care by the board of directors at the time.s6
REDUCTION OF STATED CAPITAL
It is a difficult legislative problem to fix the safeguards for the protec-
tion of creditors and preferred shareholders, under which a corporation
should be allowed to reduce its stated capital for the purpose of relaxing
the limitation on dividends and share purchases, or permitting the with-
drawal and distribution of part of the funds invested. The subject of re-
duction of "capital stock," as it is often called, is involved in rather hcpe-
less confusion in the statutes of most of the states.5 7 This is due partly to
confusion of concepts and terminology and partly to a failure to discrimi-
nate between the five different operations of (i) reducing the amount of
stated capital by action of the shareholders; (2) retiring shares; (3) ad-
justing the par value of outstanding shares to conform to stated capital
as reduced; (4) changing the share structure by amendment of the articles
as to the authorized number of par value of shares; and (5) distributing
assets to the shareholders out of surplus arising from reduction of stated
capital.
Reduction of stated capital is left largely to the whim of the manage-
ment and the shareholders, the very interests who are supposed to be
restrained from improper withdrawals. The creditors, who are the ones
supposed to be protected by stated capital, have in American legislation
no voice in its reduction, although it is otherwise under the English
Companies Act.58
Under the Illinois act there are three methods by which reduction of
the legal stated capital may be accomplished, namely:
First, by an exchange, reclassification, or cancellation of shares, or by a
reduction of the number of authorized shares of any class below the num-
ber of issued shares of that class, by amendment of the articles under
Section 52 (3), (f), (i) and (m). (See also § 55 (e) and (f).) Any such
amendment will require a two-thirds vote of the shareholders and may
also require a two-thirds vote of the class affected if the amendment falls
under the provisions of Section 54.
Second, by the redemption of shares which under the provisions of the
articles are to be cancelled and not reissued. This is provided for in Sec-
0 See Cal. Civ. Code (1931), § 4oIa.
5; But see Del Gen. Corp. Law, § 28; Ohio Page's Ann. Code (932 supp.), § 8623-39, 40.
SS ig and 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, §§ 55, s6, 57 (1929), Palmer, Company Law (14th ed.), 88-95.
THE ILLINOIS BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
tion 58. This of course applies only to redeemable preferred shares. It
does not apply even to redeemable shares unless the articles provide 'that
the shares when redeemed are to be cancelled and may not be reissued. It
is hard to see what reducing the number of authorized shares has to do
with the reduction of the amount of "stated capital." If redeemable pre-
ferred shares are "purchased" under Section 6 (unless they are purchased
under paragraph (d) for the purpose of "effecting the redemption of its
preferred shares" under Section 58), the purchase will not reduce the
stated capital.
Third, by vote of shareholders and directors under Section 59 to reduce
stated capital.
Section 59 provides for the reduction of the amount of stated capital by
resolution of the board of directors and approval of the proposal by a
majority vote of the shareholders. A surplus arising from a reduction of
stated capital is required to be set up as paid-in surplus. (§ 6o.) If a cor-
poration desires to reduce the amount of its stated capital either to get
rid of a deficit or to distribute part of its assets its stated capital may be
reduced by proceedings under Section 59 without any amendment of the
articles.
The only limitation upon reduction of stated capital under Section 6o
is the aggregate of the involuntary liquidation preferences of the non-par
preferred shares to remain outstanding. This limitation does not refer
to the liquidation preferences of par value shares or of treasury shares.
Such preferences are protected only against distributions under Section
6o.
In case of a corporation issuing only common shares without par value
or preferred non-par shares without liquidation preference or par value
shares, there seems to be no limitation upon the amount of reduction of the
stated capital. It may be reduced down to a nominal amount, leaving
practically no prescribed margin of assets over liabilities as a limitation
upon surplus available for liquidating dividends. It may distribute all its
assets down to a bare equivalence between assets and liabilities, leaving
the creditors to take all the chances on subsequent adversity59
In view of the definition of stated capital contained in Section 2 (k) it
would seem that formal reductions of stated capital may be made under
Sections 59 and 6o without any amendment reducing the par value or
liquidation preferences of outstanding or issued shares with par value, so
that the capital as reduced by formal reduction will be less than the ag-
gregate par value or liquidation preferences of all the par value shares then
s9 The corporation must have a minimum paid in capital of $i,ooo before it may commence
business. §§ 47 (i), 50.
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issued. No limitation upon reduction to the aggregate par value of shares
to remain outstanding after reduction is contained in Section 6o similar
to that contained in the California law.6o
It would seem under Sections 6 and 41 (b) referring to "any surplus
arising from surrender to the corporation of any of its shares," that a re-
duction of stated capital might be accomplished by the voluntary sur-
render by shareholders of their shares to the corporation and the retire-
ment of those shares to the status of authorized but unissued shares with-
out any amendment of the articles, unless the first paragraph of Section
59 limits these prior sections.
The amount of the stated capital is not fixed by the articles but by the
issue of shares and other proceedings. It seems peculiar that it may be re-
duced as in the Illinois law by amendment of the articles operating on the
par value of the issued shares and transferring stated capital to paid-in
surplus. (§§ 54, 55.) Under the California law °a and under the Delaware
lawdb the mere amendment of the articles reducing the number or aggre-
gate par value of the issued shares will not of itself automatically reduce
the stated capital but direct proceedings must be taken with that end and
purpose explicitly in view and with limitations for the protection of the
parties concerned, although some incidental amendment of the articles
adjusting the shares representing the stated capital may also be needed. 6z
LIQUIDATING DIVIDENDS
Surplus arising from reduction of the amount of stated capital is
designated as "paid-in surplus," as in the Minnesota act.62 An interesting
feature of the Illinois act is the provision for liquidating dividends which
may be paid out of paid-in surplus whether created by reduction of stated
capital or otherwise. (§ 6o.) The limitations on distributions on the basis
of paid-in surplus are first that the distribution shall not be made when
the corporation is insolvent or when the distribution would render it in-
solvent or reduce its net assets below its stated capital. There are the
further restrictions that no such distribution may be made unless all
cumulative dividends accrued on preferred or special classes of shares en-
titled to preferential dividends have been paid or if the distribution would
reduce the remaining net assets below the aggregate preferential amount
payable in event of voluntary liquidation to holders of shares having
60 Cal. Civ. Code (193i), § 34. See also Minn. Laws of 1933 c. 300, § 38.
60, Cal. Civ. Code (193x), § 362. 6o Del. Gen. Corp. Law, § 26.
61 See also Minn. Bus. Corp. Laws of 1933, c. 300, §§ 37, 38; State ex rel. Radio Corporation
v. Benson, 32 Del. 576, 128 Atl. 107 (1924).
62 Minn. Laws of 1933, c. 300, § 20 (IV).
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liquidation preferences. Such dividends out of paid-in surplus may be
paid only upon the vote of two-thirds of the outstanding shares of each
class, and the fact that it is a liquidating dividend must be disclosed to
the shareholders.
This provision is a great improvement in the way of protection of the
preferred shareholders over provisions to be found in the Delaware cor-
poration law and in those of many other states as to distribution of paid-
in surplus and reduction surplus. The question may be raised, however,
whether even this provision for a two-thirds vote of each class of share-
holders gives adequate protection to preferred shares. We have already
seen that stated capital may in most cases be reduced down to a nominal
amount and all of the net assets thus become subject to distribution
except for liquidation preferences.
The California General Corporation Law63 protects the preferred shares
by requiring that a "reduction surplus" be applied first to the redemption
or retirement of the preferred shares. It permits distributions of reduction
surplus among the holders of common shares only in event that there are
no other classes of shares. Preferred shares should not have their margin
of security reduced down to a mere equivalence of net assets to the aggre-
gate amount payable in event of voluntary liquidation.
The Illinois provision which may permit liquidating dividends up to
the verge of insolvency may be criticised for failing to provide adequate
protection for creditors. Under the California law64 there has been in-
cluded as a limitation upon the use or distribution of reduction surplus,
not only a determination by the directors that the distribution will not
render the corporation unable to meet its debts and liabilities when they
fall due (a more adequate protection than the Illinois test of insolvency),
but also a determination that the fair present value of its assets after such
distribution will be at least one and one-quarter times the debts and
liabilities of the corporation, thus preserving some margin or equity for
their protection. It seemed to the California committee, both in connec-
tion with dividends and distributions of assets and also in connection with
purchases by a corporation of its own shares, that the liquidity of the cor-
poration as well as the solvency should be considered, since even earned
surplus may be represented merely by the book value of fixed and un-
marketable assets. The policy is recognized in the Illinois Act, Section 58,
as to the redemption of shares, that the ability of the corporation to pay
all its known debts and liabilities as they mature should be considered, but
this does not seem to be expressly required in other analogous situations.
63 Cal. Civ. Code (i93i), § 348b. 64 Cal. Civ. Code (i93I), § 348b-
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Neither the creditors nor the preferred shareholders should be forced
to bear the risk of impairment of their security by slight business losses or
reverses or any shrinkage in the value of the net assets. As Mr. Weiner
says with reference to allowing what are liquidating dividends to be paid
on the common shares so long as assets equal to the capital preference are
retained, "the capital preference promised to the preferred stock by the
contract is wholly illusory, and the common stock obtains in reality a
preference as to capital."56
DE FACTO CORPORATIONS AND PROOF OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE
Under Section 49 of the act the issue of a certificate of incorporation by
the secretary of state, upon filing the articles of incorporation, is made
conclusive evidence, except against the state, that all conditions prece-
dent required to be performed by the incorporators have been complied
with and that the corporation is duly incorporated under the act. A
similar legal effect is given under the California General Corporation Law
to the filing of the articles by the secretary of state without the require-
ment of the issue of any certificate of incorporation."
This provision by which the certificate of incorporation establishes
corporate existence largely supersedes the necessity of resorting to the
common law doctrines of de facto corporations and of corporations by
estoppel where there is some defect or irregularity in the incorporation
papers or proceedings leading up to the issue of the certificate. In the case
of foreign corporations, however, and corporations which attempt to
organize but fail to file the articles with the secretary of state or to obtain
a certificate of incorporation, such doctrines may need to be invoked.0
Section I 5oof the Illinois act as to unauthorized assumption of cor-
porate powers seems to be a rather blind and inadequate revision of a sec-
tion of the former law.68 This section purports to impose personal liability
for debts and liabilities incurred by persons who assume to exercise corpo-
rate powers without authority to do so. It is not clear whether this liabil-
ity extends only to agents and officers who act in the name of a pretended
corporation, which is not a de facto corporation, or to all the members and
shareholders. Literally it might seem to impose personal liability on all
the agents and officers and possibly shareholders for ultra vires contracts
of a de jure corporation or of a corporation whose term of existence has
6S Anglo-Am. Dividend Law, 29 Col. L. Rev. 461, 482 (r929).
6 Cal. Civ. Code (931), §§ 292, 370, 37oa.
67 See Hall v. Woods, 325 Ill. 114, 156 N.E. 258, 269 (1927); notes in 22 A.L.R. 369, 37
A.L.R. 1319.
6 Ill. Gen. Corp. Act, 199, § 149.
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expired or of a corporation which has filed a statement of intent to dissolve
(H 42 (g), 78) or of a corporation which commences business before it has
received the amount of consideration stated in its articles to be received
for the shares to be issued before it commences business. (§§ 42 (e), 50.)
DEFENSE OF ULTRA VIRES
The Illinois act attempts to mitigate the evils of the ill-founded doctrine
of ultra vires, but makes only a partial success. The defense of ultra vires
has long been the subject of criticism by courts and writers.6 9 Statutes
have recently been adopted in California, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Pennsylvania intended to abrogate or at
any rate cut down this defense. Some of these statutes have been based
upon the proposal of the Uniform Business Corporation Act, which how-
ever seems hardly adequate.7°
California and Ohio have taken the lead in the abolition of this artificial
defense, a defense which has been -carried to unjust extremes in Illinois
with results which served no useful purpose or policy and which were con-
demned by the courts which decreed them. The substance of the Illinois
doctrine was that third persons dealing with a corporation were charged
with notice of the express and implied limitations on the corporate powers
and purposes contained in the articles and that ultra vires contracts were
void and the courts would not give aid to either party in a suit upon such
a contract. It was even held by the Illinois Supreme Court that a corpora-
tion could not realize on the security for an ultra vires loan and there was
no estoppel to set up ultra vires by the party who had received the benefit
of the contract. As Carter, J., dissenting, said, the effect was an unjust
forfeiture.7
The general theory of the California provision 72 which has been fol-
lowed to a large extent in Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota and Pennsylvania,
is the abolition of the doctrine of ultra vires as invalidating transactions
between the corporation and third parties. Limitations upon the purposes
and powers imposed by provisions of the articles may not in general be
asserted to invalidate legal transactions which have been authorized by
the directors. Shareholders are sufficiently protected if allowed to enjoin
69 Ballantine, Private Corporations (1927), 234-237; Ballantine, Questions of Policy, x9
Cal. L. Rev. 465, 473 (193I); Carpenter, Doctrine of Ultra Vires, 33 Yale L. Jour. 49 (1923).
70 See Minn. Bus. Corp. Act (I933), § II.
71 Calumet etc. Dock Co. v. Conkling, 273 Ill. 318, 112 N.E. 982, L.R.A. 1917B (I916),
814; see Ballantine, Private Corporations (1927), 258; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kastor, 273
Ill. 332, 112 N.E. 988 (I916).
72 Cal. Civil Code (I931), § 345.
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the corporation from engaging in future business outside of the purposes
authorized in the articles and to hold directors liable for losses resulting
from engaging in such unauthorized acts. The state may also raise ques-
tions of ultra vires in actions to dissolve the corporation or to enjoin the
corporation from the transaction of unauthorized business.
A serious question must, however, be raised with reference to the policy
and effect of paragraph (a) of Section 8 of the Illinois Act, and a similar
provision in Section 3o3 (1) of the new r933 Pennsylvania Business Cor-
poration Law. Under this paragraph a shareholder may proceed against
the corporation to enjoin the doing of unauthorized acts including the
performance of an executory or even a partly executed contract, and the
court may "if it deems the same to be equitable, set aside and enjoin the
performance of such contract, and in so doing shall allow to the corpora-
tion or the other parties, as the case may be, compensation for the loss or
damage sustained by either of them which may result from the action of
the court in setting aside and enjoining the performance of such contract,"
but shall not award anticipated profits as damages.
This creates a very anomalous situation indeed. Neither the corpora-
tion nor the third party may rescind the contract nor set up the defense of
ultra vires as a defense even to an action for specific performance, but in a
judicial proceeding at the instance of a shareholder against the corpora-
tion further performance may be enjoined and the contract may be re-
scinded. This perpetuates much of the old uncertainty and confusion as to
the validity of legal transactions which have been some of the worst evils
of the doctrine of ultra vires. Such vague, timorous and uncertain pro-
visions are likely to confuse the courts, encourage litigation, unsettle con-
tracts and accomplish no good purpose. Does it not seem an outrage upon
the third party to make a contract authorized by the directors binding on
him, but not on the corporation if the corporation can persuade some
shareholder to bring a suit for an injunction and rescission? This enables
the corporation to speculate at the expense of the third party and deprives
a third party contracting with a corporation in good faith of the antici-
pated profits of his partly executed contract, while reserving a right to
such profits to the corporation.
In the second paragraph of Section 8 it is provided not only that "no
limitation upon the business, purposes or powers of a corporation, express
or implied in its articles of incorporation,'" shall be asserted to defeat any
action at law or in equity between the corporation and a third person, but
also that no limitation "implied by law" shall have such effect.73 What are
73 See also Pa. Bus. Corp. Law, § 3o3.
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the limitations referred to which are "implied by law?" If a contract be
forbidden by statutory prohibitions or limitations or contrary to the com-
mon law as against public policy, it is generally held illegal and void irre-
spective of the doctrine of ultra vires. 74 The abrogation of the defense of
ultra vires based on limitations in the articles should not abrogate illegal-
ity as a ground of invalidity or rescission based on statutes or public
policy. This clause raises a question as to the effect of all the limitations
imposed upon corporations by statute such as that in Section 78 that a
corporation shall cease to carry on business except in so far as necessary
for its proper winding up after filing a statement of intent to dissolve, or
that in Section 50 as to commencement of business25
The Illinois Corporation Law follows a wise policy in not making the
abrogation of the defense of ultra vires dependent upon the question
whether or not the person dealing with the corporation has actual knowl-
edge of the limitations on the authority of its representatives, although
this view is adopted in Ohio, Minnesota and Michigan.
76
INSPECTION AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
Shareholders are entitled to adequate information for their guidance
and protection concerning their corporation, its management and financial
condition.7" Inspection of the records is only one means, and a rather poor
one, of obtaining such information. Under the former Illinois law the
right of inspection was absolute and evil motive was no defense. Under
Section 45 of the new act the books and records of account, minutes and
record of shareholders are open to inspection to shareholders of record (a)
for six months, or (b) of 5 per cent of the outstanding shares. The exercise
of such right of inspection is however now limited to "any proper pur-
pose." Doubtless the shareholder must now show proper reasons for his
demand of inspection, namely that it is for a purpose reasonably related
to his interests as a shareholder75 If inspection is sought in bad faith or
74 Stevens v. Boyes Hot Springs, 113 Cal. App. 479, 298 Pac. 308 (1931); McWilliams,
Ultra Vires Acts, 6 Cal. L. Rev. 328 (rg18); Stevens, Ultra Vires Doctrine, 36 Yale L. Jour.
297, 309 (927).
75 See Ballantine, Cal. Corp. Laws (1932), 331-334; Ballantine, Revision of the Ultra Vires
Doctrine, 12 Corn. L. Quar. 453 (1927):
,6 Ohio Page's Ann. Code (1932 supp.), § 8623-8; Minn. Laws of 1933, c. 300, § ii; Mich.
Gen. Corp. Act, § ir. See Stevens, Ultra Vires, 4 Univ. Cin. L. Rev. 419, 439 (1930),
77 Rogers v. American Tobacco Co., 143 Misc. Rep. 306, 257 N.Y. Supp. 321 (i931), and
cases cited; Ballantine, Cal. Corp. Laws (932), 386-395, 1933 Supp., i65-172.
78 See with reference to the purposes for which inspection may be had, State ex rel. Miller v.
Loft, Inc. 156 Ati. 170 (Del. 1931); Notes, 59 A.L.R. 1379; go A.L.R. 1503; 2o Cal. L. Rev.
449 (i932); Ballantine, Cal. Corp. Laws (1932), 387.
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for ulterior purposes to the injury of the corporation and the other share-
holders they may now be protected against abuse of the right.
The new act makes no provision as to any right of inspection by share-
holders of the books and records of foreign corporations kept in the state
although such a right of inspection is usually recognized in the absence of
statute. 9 Convenience dictates that the books and records of foreign
corporations should be subject to examination where they are located. °
There should be no question as to the right of inspection of all books,
records and documents of every kind, and also of the physical properties
of the corporation by every director. The California law has added a sec-
tion8 declaring the directors' right of inspection and extending it to
foreign corporations, and to the books, records, documents and properties
of subsidiary corporations.82 It seems very doubtful whether a share-
holder has any right to inspect the property of a corporation and to check
up its cash or securities with its books. s
Some more adequate methods of investigation and of getting financial
and other information should be made available to the shareholders than
the very individualistic right of inspection. The California law makes pro-
vision for investigation of the corporate affairs and the remuneration of
directors and officers by order of the court upon petition of ten per cent
of the shareholders. 4 It also makes provision for an annual report to be sent
to the shareholders in the absence of a by-law dispensing with such re-
port.15 It also provides for a compulsory financial statement upon de-
mand of a certain percentage of the shareholders with balance sheet and
profit and loss account showing essential items and the relations of the
corporation with its subsidiary corporations.86 The Illinois law gives no
recognition to the necessity of setting forth the relations between holding
corporations and their subsidiary corporations or to the making of any
compulsory reports to the shareholders or for any judicial investigation of
corporate affairs.
Shareholders, at least a certain percentage, should have t)ie right to a
79 See Rogers v. American Tobacco Co., 143 Misc. 306, 257 N.Y. Supp. 321; i8 A.L.R.
'399 ('93').
8o See Cal. Civ. Code ('93'), § 355.
81 Cal. Civ. Code (1931), § 356.
82 See as to the right of officers to inspect books and records, Notes, 22 A.L.R. 59; 8o A.L.R.
iio; Ballantine, Cal. Corp. Laws (1932), 1933 Supp., x67.
83 But see Win. Coale Dev. Co. v. Kennedy, 121 Ohio St. 582, 17o N.E. 434 (i93o).
84 Cal. Civ. Code (93), § 357.
8s Cal.'Civ. Code (93i), § 358.
86 Cal. Civ. Code (1931), §§ 358, 359. See Minn. Laws of 1933, § 34; Ballantine, Cal. Corp.
Laws, 1933 Supp., 171-183.
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full disclosure by the directors of the financial conditions of the corpora-
tion and of matters affecting the compensation of the executive officers
such as salaries, bonuses and stock purchase plans. There is a growing
protest against the excessive compensation often diverted by the manage-
ment from the corporate funds and there will probably develop an in-
sistent demand for disclosure to the shareholders and to the public by the
corporate management of all compensation received and of all transac-
tions such as the issue and purchase of shares by which the management
and the controlling shareholders obtain pecuniary benefits or advantages
which are not enjoyed by all the shareholders alike.
VOTING RIGHTS AND MEETINGS
The Illinois Constitution, Article XI, Section 3, has been construed by
the Supreme Court to mean that directors must be elected by the share-
holders. In case of a vacancy occurring on the board the remaining mem-
bers of the board cannot be authorized to fill the vacancy, as is customary
under the corporation laws of other states8 7 Accordingly Section 36 of
the Illinois act provides that vacancies in the board must be filled by the
shareholders. It was also considered unsafe to provide that the articles of
incorporation might designate the first board of directors, and according-
ly Section 47 (j) provides that the articles shall specify the number of
directors to be elected at the first meeting of the shareholders. The elec-
tion of the first directors and adoption of by-laws is provided for at an
organization meeting of shareholders. (§ 5i.) Under the California law"8
the necessity of holding any such organization meeting of shareholders is
avoided by the naming of directors in the articles and the corporation
comes into existence with a board of directors able to adopt by-laws and
to function without any meeting of shareholders.
The same provision of the Illinois Constitution also provides for cumu-
lative voting, and Section 28 accordingly gives each shareholder the right
to cumulate his votes and give one candidate as many votes as the number
of directors (to be elected?) multiplied by the number of his shares shall
equal, or to distribute his votes on the same principle among as many
candidates as he shall think fit. In case the directors are classified with
only one-half or one-third of nine directors elected annually, as is pro-
vided in Section 35, presumably the benefits of cumulative voting are cut
down, since the larger the number of directors to be elected the greater the
chance of minority holders to secure a representative on the board. In
order to protect the right or advantage of cumulative voting, under the
87 People ex rel. Weber v. Cohn, 339 11. 121, 171 N.E. 159 (Ig3o).
88 Cal. Civ. Code (i93r), § 290.
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California law, the number of directors cannot be reduced below five with-
out the vote or consent of more than 8o per cent of the voting power. 89
Shareholders holding 20 per cent of the voting power may elect one out of
five directors by cumulating their votes, but would lose this power if the
number of directors is reduced below five. -
The Constitution only guarantees full voting rights in all elections of
directors, but the statute does not authorize the limitation of voting rights
even of preferred shareholders as to any other matters. The articles may
not limit or deny the voting power of shares of any class (§ 14) and each
outstanding share, regardless of class, is entitled to one vote on each
matter submitted to vote at a meeting (§ 28). The privilege of greater
voting rights, in event of non-payment of preferred dividends for certain
periods, is thus forbidden to preferred shares.
Section 26 of the act commands that an annual meeting of the share-
holders shall be held at such time and place as may be provided in the by-
laws. Section 34 proVides that at the first annual meeting of shareholders
and at each annual meeting thereafter, shareholders shall elect directors
to hold office until the next succeeding annual meeting, except as directors
may be classified under Section 35 to hold until the second or third suc-
ceeding annual meeting. It is generally held that such a provision that
there shall be an annual meeting for the election of directors confers a
right on the individual shareholder, of which he should not be deprived by
the officers or by collusion of a majority, to have an election held. It has
been pointed out that the ultimate control of the management and policy
of the corporation is in the shareholders, .and this control cannot be exer-
cised unless meetings of the shareholders are called as prescribed.90 Hold-
ers of not less than one-fifth of the outstanding shares may demand the
calling of a meeting for the election of directors.
Minority shareholders would be deprived of their right of cumulative
voting and of their chance to elect a representative on the board if the
majority were to defeat the holding of a meeting by voluntarily absenting
themselves from a meeting duly called. In order to prevent evasion of
meetings by lack of a quorum it is provided in the Delaware act 9°a that
at any election ordered to be held by the chancellor upon the application
of any shareholder, the shares of stock represented at said meeting, either
in person or by proxy, shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of such
meeting, notwithstanding any provision of the by-laws of the corporation
89 Cal. Civ. Code (1931), §§ 303, 362a. Cf. Ill. Bus. Corp. Act, § 34.
90 Bartlett v. Gates, x18 Fed. 66 (1902); Pennington v. Pennington Sons, 170 Cal. "14, 148
Pac. 790 (1915); Albert E. Touchet, Inc. v. Touchet, 264 Mass. 499, 163 N.E. 184 (1928).
90a Del. Gen. Corp. Law, § 31.
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to the contrary. It was the rule of the common law that those who
assemble at a shareholders' meeting, although a minority of the voting
shares, constitute a quorum.9' It would seem that some provision should
be made to prevent the majority from keeping directors representing the
majority indefinitely in office without giving the minority a chance to
exercise their right of cumulative voting.
The provision as to notice of shareholders' meetings (§ 27) fails to
provide for giving any constructive notice if the address of the share-
holder does not appear upon the records of the corporation. Failure to
deliver notice either personally or by mail to each shareholder of record
entitled to vote might invalidate the meeting and all transactions thereat.
The provision as to notice of directors' meetings (§ 40) leaves the
method of notice to provision in the by-laws and does not provide for the
giving of any notice in the absence of by-law provision. The California
law has in general attempted to make the act sufficiently complete to
permit a corporation to carry on its business in event that there should not
be a code of by-laws or that it should be incomplete as to any detail, in
such matters as the time of the annual meeting or the time and method of
notice of meetings.92
The Illinois act does not permit shareholders to act by majority written
consent when shareholders' action is required, but action may be taken by
the shareholders without a meeting only by unanimous consent. (§ 147.)
It was evidently the view of the corporation committee that to permit
such action by bare majority consent, or even by a two-thirds or three-
fourths consent, would deprive minority dissenters of their fair op-
portunity to present their reasons against the proposed action in open
meeting and to have the pros and cons fully discussed.
SALE OF ENT]=E ASSETS
Under Sections 71 and 72 the sale, lease, exchange or mortgage of all or
substantially all the property and assets of a corporation may be made in
the "usual and regular course of the business of the corporation" by the
directors without any authorization or consent of the shareholders. But
when not made "in the usual and regular course of its business," the terms
and conditions and consideration of such sale must be authorized not only
by resolution of the directors but also by vote of the holders of at least
two-thirds of the outstanding shares.
It is difficult to see what is intended by the sale of the entire assets of a
91 Morrill v. Little Falls Mfg. Co., 53 Minn. 371, 55 N.W. 547 (1903). See also Lutz v.
Webster, 249 Pa. 226, 94 Ati. 834 (1915).
92 Cal. Civ. Code (1931), §§ 307a, 312.
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corporation in the usual and regular course of its business. What classes
of corporations regularly convert all of their assets into cash? This pe-
culiar provision seems to be borrowed from the Indiana act.9 3 The board
of directors might reasonably be given authority to sell the entire property
of a corporation without vote of the shareholders, (i) if the corporation is
in a failing condition and the sale is required by the exigencies of the
business and to meet its liabilities; or (2) if the sale is made to further
rather than to terminate or dispose of the business for which the corpora-
tion is organized.9 4 An investment trust, for example, formed for holding
and trading in securities, might at certain times do well to convert all its
securities into cash as part of the regular conduct of its business. A cor-
poration formed to liquidate an estate would naturally be allowed to sell
out its entire holdings without vote of the shareholders. A mortgage of
the entire assets does not normally terminate the business. The Cali-
fornia law does not require a vote of the shareholders to authorize the
mortgage of the entire assets of a corporation, as, for example, in connec-
tion with a bond issue.95 But a sale of a business used as a method of com-
bination, reorganization or consolidation with another corporation may
well require the shareholders' consent. The phrase "in the usual and regu-
lar course of its business" does not seem to be a happy one to indicate the
distinctions intended.
REMEDIES OF DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS
The remedies of dissenting shareholders in case of a sale. of entire assets
are covered in Section 73 and in case of consolidation or merger in Section
7o. The reason for separate sections seems to be that in case of merger or
consolidation the surviving or new corporation, which would be a do-
mestic corporation in all cases, would be the proper corporation to pay the
dissenting shareholder the amount due him. Under Section 73, however,
the remedy is given against the selling corporation as the sale may be
made to a foreign corporation and it would be a great hardship to require
the dissenting shareholder to pursue his remedy against the acquiring
corporation. Under the California law 6 compensation for dissenting
shareholders is only given in the case of merger and consolidation and the
remedy is to be sought against the constituent corporation rather than
against the new or surviving corporation which, however, is liable for the
debts of its constituents. 9 7
93 Ind. Bum's Ann. Stats. (1929 supp.), §§ 4856.3, 4856.4.
94 Thayer v. Valley Bank, 35 Ariz. 238, 276 Pac. 526 (1929); Unif. Bus. Corp. Act, § 37.
95 Cal. Civ. Code (i93'), §§ 343, 344.
96 Cal. Civ. Code (ig3i), § 369. 97 See Minn. Laws of 1933, c. 30, § 43.
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In the case of merger or consolidation the Illinois act requires the dis-
senting shareholder to file with the corporation, prior to or at the meeting
of shareholders at which the plan is voted on, a written objection to the
plan of merger or consolidation. This is a very strict requirement as a
condition precedent to further proceedings. (§ 70.) In case of a sale of
entire assets "any shareholder who shall not have voted in favor thereof"
may make written demand for the fair value of his shares within 20 days
after the vote was taken (§ 73), which is a more reasonable provision.
Under both Sections 70 and 73 shareholders failing to pursue their
remedy by way of petition for compensation are to be conclusively pre-
sumed to have approved and ratified the merger or consolidation or the
sale or exchange, and are to be bound by the terms thereof. This would
seem to make this remedy the exclusive remedy and there would be no
right to litigate or contest such action on the ground of fraud or unfairness.
More explicit provision to this effect is made in the California law98
These sections only extend to dissenting "shareholders" who by the
definition of Section 2 (g) must be holders of record. A question may arise
whether owners of shares, that is transferees who have not obtained record
of the transfer on the books, would be affected either by the benefits or
the limitations of these sections.
DISSOLUTION AND WINDING UP
In accordance with American tradition a limited term of existence may
be stated in the articles. (§ 5 (a).) An option is given to make the period
of duration of corporate life as stated in the articles perpetual. (§ 47 (c).)
The writer is informed that there was blind, but vigorous, opposition in
the legislature to permitting anything except a term of existence for a
limited period of years.
Under California law prior to 1929 the term of corporate existence was
limited to a maximum of fifty years, but under the statutes as revised
since 1929 no option has been given to prescribe any fixed term of exist-
ence at the end of which the corporation will be automatically dissolved.99
Such an arbitrary time of termination prescribed in advance may operate
harshly upon innocent third persons dealing with the corporation, and
also may easily be overlooked by the corporation, its creditors and share-
holders, giving rise to much needless trouble, expense and confusion and
the necessity of winding up and reincorporating. The shareholders should
decide when the time has come for the corporate affairs to be wound up
99 Cal. Civ. Code (1931), § 292.91 Cal. Civ. Code (1931), § 369.
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and liquidated and should not be put on their guard to procure an exten-
sion of existence before it is too late.
°00
By amendment of the articles the period of duration may be changed so
as to bring about a speedy automatic dissolution without notice to
creditors. (§ 52 (b).) Unfortunately there seems to be no provision for the
winding up and liquidation of corporations upon dissolution by the expira-
tion of the fixed period of duration. (§§ 79, 8o, 8i, 89, and 94.) It seems
to be contemplated by the statute that the distribution of the assets will
precede dissolution.
The Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law, which in general follows
the Illinois act in these matters of dissolution and winding up among
others, has made provision °°a (§ iio6) for the winding up of a corpora-
tion upon the expiration of its charter and for the continuance of its
existence for the purpose of winding up its affairs by the board of direc-
tors. '
The Illinois act. fails to provide for the continuation of corporate exist-
ence of dissolved corporations for winding up purposes, and it does not
appear in the act what becomes of the title to corporate property upon
dissolution. Modern laws should provide machinery by which the title to
real estate and other assets will not become complicated or confused upon
dissolution, but may be dealt with as corporate estate for shareholders and
creditors. °2 It would seem to be highly advisable to have a provision for
the indefinite continuance of corporate existence in all cases of dissolution
for winding up purposes rather than a provision for a mere survival of
remedies after dissolution for a limited period, as under Section 94 of the
Illinois act. The California law1°2a continues the corporate existence in-
definitely, no matter how a corporation may be dissolved, even by order of
court, for purposes of winding up so far as needed. This provision was
taken in substance from the New Jersey act.102b
Under the Illinois act (§ 94) in cases of dissolution the rights and reme-
dies of creditors and claimants against the corporation, its directors or
shareholders, for any liability incurred prior to such dissolution, are pre-
served if suit thereon is brought and service had within two years after the
date of dissolution. There seems to be no provision, however, for the
1oo § 52 (b); Ballantine, Cal. Corp. Laws (1932), 58, 473-
10o, Pa. Bus. Corp. Law, § 11o6.
', See also Cal. Civ. Code (1931), §§ 399, 4oo; Ballantine, Questions of Policy, i9 Cal. L.
Rev. 465, 482 (I93I).
'0'47 Am. L. Rep. 1288, 1425, 1545 n.
1o2, Cal. Civ. Code, § 399. ro-b N.J. Gen. Corp. Act, § 53.
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survival of rights and remedies upon claims in favor of the corporation.
Suits may be prosecuted against and defended by the corporation in its cor-
porate name so that the corporate existence is continued for this purpose.
It would seem that under this section creditors and claimants might be
barred within two years after the date of dissolution even though dissolu-
tion took place by expiration of the term of existence without any notice
to the creditors, and even though the claim was not yet due and the cor-
poration was continuing in business in spite of its dissolution. This ap-
parently opens up possibilities of great hardship upon creditors.
Under Section 74 provision is made for the dissolution of a corporation
by its incorporators, but the statement must be made "that none of its
shares have (has) been issued." Such a statement would seem to be im-
possible in any case, since under Section 16 the filing of the articles of
incorporation constitutes acceptance by the corporation of all existing
subscriptions to its shares and the subscribers become shareholders.
Under Section 46 the incorporators must be subscribers to shares. Section
74 therefore was born dead and can never be utilized unless paragraph (3)
can be interpreted with Section 16 to exclude necessary preincorporation
subscriptions of the incorporators.
Section 76 provides for an election by the corporation to dissolve volun-
tarily and wind up its affairs, but there is no provision for the revocation
of such election, as there is under Section 90 in case of involuntary liquida-
tion proceedings commenced under Section 86 at the suit of a shareholder
or creditor.
Section 79 provides in a very brief and general way for the winding up
of the affairs of a corporation by the directors and officers who continue
to function after filing of a statement of intent to dissolve, but if applica-
tion is made by a corporation which has filed a statement of intent to dis-
solve to have liquidation continued under the supervision of the court,
it seems that the winding up must be carried on by liquidating receivers.
(§§ 86, 87.) No clear authority is given to the directors to invoke the aid
and supervision of the court only to the extent needed or desired. Under
the California law provision is made for the winding up by the board of
directors even when carried out under supervision of the court in volun-
tary or involuntary proceedings, subject to the power of removal, without
the necessity of the appointment of any receivers to carry on the liquida-
tion, a method of administration which has usually proved expensive and
even disastrous. The California corporation law avoids as far as possible
any authorization for the appointment of receivers except as a last resort. 0 3
103 Cal. Civ. Code (193), § 401, 403, 4o3a, 4o3b; Cal. Civ. Proc. (193), §§ 564, 565; Bal-
lantine, Cal. Corp. Laws (1932), 460, 464, 484.
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Section 91 provides for the making of a decree of involuntary dissolu-
tion when all debts, obligations and liabilities of the corporation have been
paid and discharged and all property distributed to the shareholders, but
it does not make provision for such decree in event that the payment of
the debts, obligations and liabilities has been adequately provided for as
in the case of voluntary dissolution. (§ 8o (c).) Suppose certain creditors
cannot be found or certain claims are in litigation?104
Section 93 provides for the deposit with the state treasurer of amounts
due shareholders who are unknown or cannot be found or who are under
disability, but no provision seems to be made for deposits on behalf of
creditors who cannot be located or whose claims are in dispute.I s5
The provisions of Section 86 as to involuntary dissolution at the suit of
a shareholder extend not only to cases of deadlock in the management but
also to cases where it is claimed "that the acts of the directors or those in
control of the corporation are illegal, oppressive or fraudulent, or that the
corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted." This confers a drastic
remedy by way of involuntary dissolution in very vague and general
terms which will make it easy for a single obstreperous shareholder or a
small disgruntled minority to interfere with the management of the major-
ity by creating a cash nuisance value.
The provisions of the California law on involuntary dissolution °6 as
adopted in 1931, have been much limited after further discussion in the
revision of 1933. The result of involuntary dissolution is a forfeiture of
the corporate rights and a sacrifice or liquidation sale of all of its assets
and business. This is so severe a remedy that the mere threat of institu-
tion of such proceedings may give minority shareholders an unfair ad-
vantage and may be used as a method of forcing majority interests to
purchase their shares at an exorbitant figure."°7
Aside from involuntary dissolution there exist various equitable reme-
dies such as the removal of dishonest directors from office, representative
suits by the shareholders against the corporation and the directors for mis-
management or waste, the use of injunctions and other possible remedies.
Relief by way of involuntary winding up or dissolution should be withheld
unless there is no other method of relief or redress for the protection of the
interests of the complaining shareholders which is adequate under the
circumstances.
In event of deadlock in management the California law makes an inter-
esting innovation, new in the corporation law of this country, as an
104 Cf. Cal. Civ. Code (i93i), § 403c.
105 Cf. Cal. Civ. Code (Ig3I), § 40 3 d. xo6 Cal. Civ. Code (1931), § 404.
107 Ballantine, Cal. Corp. Laws (1932), 1933 Supp., 256, 257.
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alternative to receivership or to dissolution, namely the appointment by
the court of a "provisional director" to sit with the board of directors and
act as a member of the board until such time as the deadlock in the board
is broken or until he be removed by order of the court or the vote of the
shareholders. The court is given authority to appoint such provisional
director in the case of a deadlock in the board even in an action for in-
voluntary winding up or dissolutionioS
It seems very doubtful whether a creditor of the corporation should be
empowered to enforce its involuntary dissolution on the ground that the
corporation is unable to pay its debts and obligations in the regular course
of business as they mature. (§ 86 (b).) A creditor is not interested in
formal dissolution, but only in the application of the assets to the pay-
ment of his claim. It may or may not be for the best interests of the share-
holders to have the corporation dissolved.
The Illinois act seems to make no provision for the liability of share-
holders or owners of shares to the corporation and its creditors for amounts
improperly distributed to them in the course of dissolution or winding up
proceedings. This is a matter covered in the California corporation law' °9
and provision is made under which those who satisfy any liability may
obtain rateable contribution from other distributees and so adjust an
erroneous distribution of assets.
SOME NESCELLANEOUS POINTS LACKING IN THE ILLINOIS ACT
Some matters, not referred to above, which are covered by provisions
in the California General Corporation Law might well be considered in a
further revision of the Illinois Business Corporation Act, as follows: (i)
the removal of directors by the shareholders or by the court;110 (2) the
effect of adverse interest of directors and of interlocking directors upon
contracts and other transactions in which the directors participate or are
counted to make up a quorum;", (3) appointment of inspectors of elec-
tions; (4) the validity of voting trusts;" 2 (5) protection to the corporation
as to its duty of recording transfers of shares upon its books in case of
transfers by trustees, certificate holders with doubtful title, adverse
claimants, foreign fiduciaries, minors, and incompetents;"13 (6) the com-
pulsory surrender and exchange of certificates for shares in event of
amendment of the articles or cancellation of shares;'14 (7) definition of
holding and subsidiary corporations,"5 and (8) proof of corporate proceed-
ings, documents and seals." 6
106 Cal. Civ. Code (i931), § 404.
l09 Ibid. § 402. no Ibid. § 3io. Ibid. §3Ii. 112 Ibid. § 321a.
113 Ibid. §§ 328, 328a, 328b, 3 28d, 328e.
114 Ibid. § 3 26b. 1.S Ibid. § 278. 26 Ibid. §§ 371, 372, 374.
